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It appears that there is sufficient evidence to believe that the Portland Police Department 
indulges in stop and frisk practices in Albina. They seem to feel that they have the right 
to stop and frisk someone because his skin is black and he is in the black part of town. 
— Attorney commenting in City Club of Portland’s Report on Law Enforcement, 1981 
DurinG the 1960s, institutionalized discrimination, unemployment, 
and police brutality fueled inter-racial tensions in cities across America, 
including Portland, Oregon. Riots became more frequent, often resulting 
in death and destruction. Pres. Lyndon Johnson’s National Advisory Com-
mission on Civil Disorders issued in early 198 what became known as the 
“Kerner Report,” which declared that the nation was “moving toward two 
societies, one black, one white — separate and unequal.”2 Later that year, 
the City Club of Portland published a document titled Report on Problems 
of Racial Justice in Portland, its own version of the national study. The report 
documented evidence of racial discrimination in numerous institutions, 
including the police bureau. The section “Police Policies, Attitudes, and 
Practices” began with the following statement:
The Mayor and the Chief of Police have indicated that in their opinions the Kerner 
Report is not applicable to Portland. Satisfactory police-citizen relations are not likely 
to be achieved as a reality in Portland in the absence of a fundamental change in the 
philosophy of the officials who formulate policy for the police bureau.
The City Club report also discussed the findings of the Kerner Report, not-
ing that it “cited deep hostility between police and ghetto communities as 
a primary cause of the disorders” in dozens of cities, while arguing that in a 
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“fundamental sense” it would be wrong to characterize the problem “solely 
as hostility to police.” Police officers, it explained, represented not just law 
enforcement but also “much deeper problems” within the larger society: 
“The policeman in the ghetto is a symbol, finally, of a society from which 
many ghetto Negroes are increasingly alienated.” 3 
Portland police clash with young Albina residents on Union Avenue in 1969. By 1960, 
four-fifths of the city’s black population lived in the Albina neighborhood — a result 
of racial segregation and isolation — while the vast majority of officers who policed 
the neighborhood were white.
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In 198, the City Club of Portland also issued a document titled Report 
on Law Enforcement in the City of Portland, which confirmed what many 
in Portland’s African American community already knew. In the Albina 
neighborhood, citizen harassment and social control were higher Police 
Bureau priorities than public safety. At that time, African Americans com-
prised more than 0 percent of some Albina District neighborhoods, yet 
they made up just 1 percent of Portland’s 20 police officers.4 Rev. Eugene 
Boyd, co-founder of the Albina Ministerial Alliance, recalled the difficulty 
of gaining police services during the early 190s: “We knew that our part 
of the city had been designated as where all this stuff [crime, drugs, pros-
titution] should go on.” According to Richard White’s study of faith-based 
community organizing in Portland, 
[Boyd] and a small contingency of pastors and neighbors met with a deputy police 
chief who referred to Albina as “the Tombstone territory,” indicating that the “law of the 
streets” would have to prevail because the police would offer no additional help. When 
the same group met with Mayor Terry Schrunk, Boyd said the Mayor calmly asserted 
that because illicit drug use was relatively confined to black neighborhoods it was not 
really a large enough concern to warrant an additional police presence. 
Boyd reasoned that the city’s neglect of crime and public safety issues in 
Albina prevented black citizens from being “accepted by the whole com-
munity.”5 
Patterns of residential segregation and racial isolation led many residents 
in Albina and similar inner-city neighborhoods across the country to view 
their communities as internal colonies, dependent on outsiders for political 
and economic resources and subject to the authority of white-dominated 
institutions such as the school district, police, and welfare bureaucracy. After 
an uprising in the summer of 19, youth worker Frank Fair spoke of a “new 
awareness” among Albina youth: “They come to realize that if Albina is going 
to be categorized as a colony, something separate and foreign from the city, 
they’ll have to deal with their problems on those terms.”
Historian Kevin Mumford discusses how the Kerner Commission’s inter-
views with “local black militants” after the 19 Newark uprising revealed 
“their deep resentment of the police and diminished faith in the govern-
ment,” which made them “more likely to speak of analogies with colonial 
military struggles” and to “identify with international struggles against 
domination.” Historian Thomas Sugrue notes in his Sweet Land of Liberty 
that northern black urbanites had their consciousness raised by the colonial 
analogy and sought to gain control of their own communities through upris-
ings, organizing, and political activism during the late 190s.8 The colonial 
framework challenged liberalism because it argued for the redistribution 
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of power and institutional control, rather than assimilation and integration 
into existing institutions through practices such as school busing and affir-
mative action. Despite popular acceptance of the colonial understanding of 
race relations, it never attained acceptance in mainstream intellectual circles 
because of its association with the black power movement.9
In a 195 article on race and crime, sociologist Robert Staples explained 
that according to the colonial model police acted as “agents to enforce the 
status quo.” The police role in the black community was not to provide for 
public safety but to “protect the property of the colonizers who live outside 
those communities and to restrain any black person from breaking out of 
the colonial wards in the event of violence.”10 The findings of the Kerner 
Commission, showing differential treatment of black communities (more 
tolerance of illegal activities and violence, police brutality, and less urgent 
responses to calls for help), therefore should come as no surprise. According 
to the colonial model, the lack of black representation in law enforcement 
and the prejudiced attitudes of white police were to be expected, because 
the police were agents of the colonizer, who used the rule of law to control 
the dependent ghetto colony. 
Contemporary perceptions of the police are similar to Staples’s argument 
that the police oversaw inhabitants of “colonial wards” in order to reinforce 
the status quo in race relations. Those perceptions also demonstrate that the 
colonial model retains some explanatory power for understanding today’s 
police-community relations.11 Despite the long-standing controversy over 
racial profiling and the use of force on black suspects, historian Marcy 
Sacks notes that there has been little “scholarly inquiry into the origins and 
implications of the uneasy relationship between urban black populations 
and overwhelmingly white police forces.”12 While many historical stud-
ies discuss the role of police brutality in setting off riots throughout the 
twentieth century, few studies analyze in detail the relationship between 
the police and majority-black urban communities.13 Sacks shows that as the 
black population grew in Manhattan at the turn of the twentieth century, 
black people were “singled out as targets of enmity and suspicion” and 
“harassed and brutalized by police officers” who “preferred to subjugate and 
intimidate” rather than protect, allowing “vice and crime to flourish in black 
neighborhoods.”14 This article adds to that work by chronicling the history 
of the black community’s attempts to reform policing in Portland’s Albina 
District and the subsequent fierce resistance the community encountered 
from rank-and-file officers, police commanders, and elected officials. 
The story begins in the mid 190s, when policing became a major civil 
rights issue in Portland, and ends in 1985 with the murder of black Port-
lander Lloyd “Tony” Stevenson at the hands of the police. In Portland, three 
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issues have been the objects of police reform: reduction of police brutality, 
increased civilian oversight of the police, and increased black representation 
in law enforcement. During the long and persistent struggle, some progress 
was made. Nevertheless, by the mid 1980s, the relationship between the 
Portland police and the black community remained essentially unchanged, 
and racial equality continued to be an elusive goal in Portland. The urgency 
with which black Portlanders pushed for police reform throughout that 
time suggests that they viewed police as playing a critical role in upholding 
structural inequality. This story also suggests that local politicians were 
responsible for instituting any meaningful reform that would have reshaped 
the relationship between the police and the black community. 
the City CLub’S racial justice report found, in Portland, the same 
problems that the Kerner Commission found “to exist in large cities in 
general”: “discrimination or inadequacies” in areas such as police practices, 
employment, housing, education, health, municipal services, and consumer 
treatment. It concluded that the causes and effects of these problems were 
similar, and that the “differences” between Portland’s problems and “those of 
Watts, Newark, or Detroit” (where uprisings also took place) were just a mat-
ter of “degree.”15 Throughout northern cities, local governments permitted 
vice to prosper in black districts and had the areas patrolled by non-resident 
white police. Sugrue writes: “Perhaps the biggest problem facing northern 
police departments, especially in cities with large black populations, was 
the paucity of black police officers.” That lack of representation, combined 
with police harassment, helped delegitimize law enforcement authority 
among blacks. In addition, the majority of northern blacks distrusted local 
government because of ongoing discriminatory policies having to do with 
housing, school segregation, and urban renewal.1 Stuart McElderry argues 
that, by 1940, the first phase of ghettoization was complete in Portland, with 
0 percent of the city’s roughly 1,900 African Americans living in the Wil-
liams Avenue district because of hostility from white residents, real estate 
industry discrimination, and local public housing policy.1 During the 1950s, 
Albina’s white population declined by half as its black population doubled. 
By 190, four-fifths of the city’s 15,000 African Americans were crowded 
into a two-and-a-half-square-mile area in the Albina District, and four 
elementary schools (Boise, Eliot, Humboldt, and King) were more than 90 
percent black. 18 
In Albina, as in other black districts, urban renewal projects (such as 
Lloyd Center, Memorial Coliseum, and Emanuel Hospital) and highways 
(99W, I-5, and 405) reconfigured the neighborhood, increasing segregation 
from the 1950s through the 190s.19 By 190, among West Coast cities, the 
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level of black-white residential segregation in Portland was second only to 
Los Angeles, as measured by the dissimilarity, or “evenness,” index.20 Segrega-
tion meant that while the city was more than 90 percent white and the black 
population never exceeded  percent, there were neighborhoods in Albina 
that were more than two-thirds black. Those majority-black neighborhoods 
were patrolled by white police. The manifest power of residential segregation, 
urban renewal bulldozers, and police harassment and brutality prompted 
many black urbanites in Albina, and nationwide, to think of themselves as 
living in a colony subject to external rule. In response, activists worked to 
gain community control over local institutions, including the police. 
During the early 190s, 45 percent of all Portland arrestees were black, yet 
blacks made up less than 5 percent of the city’s population.21 Racism within 
the criminal justice system had become part of the civil-rights discourse in 
Portland, and it appeared that policy changes might soon follow. In 194, the 
death of Albina resident Cleotis Rhodes at the hands of the Portland police 
This photo looks north along N. Williams Avenue in 1967. Local newspapers referred 
to the area as crime-ridden, despite its thriving businesses and active neighborhood 
associations. A November 2, 1967, newspaper clipping attached to the photograph 
in the Oregon Historical Society’s collection reads: “By day, even Portland’s ‘old 
town’ streets look innocent enough; but at night, SW 1st to 3rd and ‘the avenue’ — 
N Williams — come to life with activity city vice squad members do not consider 
healthy.”
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sparked a rewriting of the department’s use-of-force policies. A grand jury 
cleared Officer Edwin Freeman, who had shot Rhodes after a traffic stop, 
of any criminal charges but found Freeman’s actions “indefensible.” 22 The 
jury was bewildered by Freeman’s decision to transport the injured man 
across town to Portland Sanitarium Hospital when Emanuel Hospital was 
just a few blocks away. That August, in response to Rhodes’s death, newly 
sworn-in police chief Donald McNamara revised the bureau’s Manual of 
Procedures on the use of weapons to read: 
It is here emphasized that firearms are to be used only as a last resort when other means 
fail: a) to defend himself or another person from death or serious injury, b) to prevent 
the commission of a felony, c) to apprehend a fleeing felon or to prevent the escape of 
a convicted felon [emphasis added].23 
While Rhodes’s death indicated that deep problems existed between the 
police and the black community, McNamara’s response to the shooting 
seemed to signal a willingness to work on improving relations. 
Most rank-and-file officers, however, were not advocates of racial equal-
ity. According to a 19 survey of Portland police, 8 percent of officers 
believed that the civil rights movement was “moving too fast,” and more 
than half believed racial equality was happening “much too fast.”24 Port-
land police officers’ attitudes toward civil rights mirrored those of their 
counterparts around the country, but the resistance to racial equality was 
comparatively pronounced in Portland. Nevertheless, the Portland Police 
Intelligence Division did not begin to closely monitor activists in the civil 
rights movement until the mid 190s. 
The Portland police, like departments in many other major urban areas, 
had a history of monitoring and harassing political activists that dated to 
the establishment of Red Squads in the 1920s.25 In the mid 190s, rank-and-
file officers considered spying on political organizations a legitimate police 
function. A 19 survey of Portland police officers ranked “keeping track of 
subversives” as the eighth most important aspect of policing, above “traffic 
duties,” “control of vice,” and “helping little old ladies.”2 The Intelligence 
Division not only collected information about political groups but also used 
that information to subvert activists. A lieutenant with the Portland Police 
Intelligence Division (also referred to in documents as the Intelligence Unit) 
compared the intelligence process to making bread: “You take some flour, 
water, yeast — massage it a little and come up with a product.”2 Intelligence 
officers used information they gathered to spread rumors about their tar-
gets, foster dissension within and among activist organizations, and accuse 
targeted individuals of illegal subversive activity regardless of whether the 
information supported their charges.
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The respite from Intelligence Division monitoring that Portland’s early 
civil rights organizations enjoyed ended once those organizations began to 
focus on issues of police brutality. In 195, Melvin Spencer, Cleotis Rhodes’s 
brother-in-law, came under police scrutiny after he attended a public hear-
ing on police brutality organized by the City of Portland Intergroup Rela-
tions Committee. When police overheard committee member James Hill 
and his coworkers at the Upward Bound college readiness program mak-
ing statements that were antagonistic to law enforcement, the Intelligence 
Division began keeping track of their movements and associations. The 
Intelligence Division even noted that one committee member was involved 
in an interracial relationship. Unlike other activist groups monitored by 
the Intelligence Unit, the civil rights and anti-poverty organizations had 
no ideological ties to left-wing or Communist groups. Most were engaged 
in government-sponsored War on Poverty efforts, but they also were vocal 
in their criticism of the Portland police. A group of anti-poverty and civil 
rights workers that the Intelligence Division called the “Activist Group” was 
working on a “project about police brutality, harassment, and intimidation.”28 
Many of those involved in War on Poverty efforts were young people who 
had experienced routine harassment by the police. 
Civil rights and anti-poverty organizations’ criticisms of the police 
reflected the growing frustration that many young Albina residents felt — 
a frustration that erupted in the summer of 19 in Irving Park.29 Young 
people threw rocks and bottles at the police, and the disturbance quickly 
moved to nearby Union Avenue, where fires were set, windows were broken, 
and a stereo store was looted. Unlike later riots in Albina, the Irving Park 
disturbance was not sparked by a specific incident. Young participants were 
frustrated by unresolved problems in their community and especially by the 
constant police presence. One rioter commented:
Where else but in Albina do cops hang around the streets and parks all day like planta-
tion overseers? Just their presence antagonizes us. We feel like we are being watched all 
of the time.30 
After the Irving Park riot, police increased their surveillance of Albina 
neighborhood activists and meticulously recorded any confrontations they 
had with young black residents, often referring Albina youth to the Intel-
ligence Division. 
The Intelligence Unit scrutinized young activists who publicly criticized 
the police or were associated with other civil rights organizers already under 
surveillance. Through both direct observation and the use of informants, 
police kept track of activists’ political activities, friends, and daily movements. 
As Intelligence gathered more information on activists, it cast a wider net, 
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entangling more Albina civil rights organizers into the investigation. Once 
an activist was caught up in an Intelligence inquiry, officers attempted to 
link him or her to various illegal activities until they found a charge that 
would stick; for example, the police arrested Colton Brown, an Upward 
Bound worker, on a charge of mail fraud for neglecting to fill orders for his 
company, Black Fashion Inc.31 
By the late 190s, the Intelligence Unit’s monitoring of civil rights activists 
intensified, partly due to heightened federal efforts to monitor and disrupt 
the civil rights movement. In March 198, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover 
expanded his agency’s domestic counter-intelligence program (COINTEL-
PRO) to a number of states, including Oregon.32 Hoover ordered each office 
to designate one FBI agent to direct COINTELPRO, aimed to disrupt and 
discredit the Black Nationalist movement, and to coordinate efforts with local 
police. The local FBI field office tried to persuade doctors to stop volunteer-
ing at the Black Panthers’ health and dental clinics, attempted to inflame 
local Jewish leaders by accusing Black Nationalists of anti-Semitism, and 
falsely accused activists of being police informants.33 Portland police had been 
A man is chased by three Portland policemen during the 1967 Irving Park riot in 
Albina, an event that had begun as a peaceful rally by black activists. 
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spying on political dissenters and actively disrupting political organizations 
for decades, but the federal COINTELPRO provided additional legitimacy 
and support for such activities.
By the early 190s, however, many of the tactics that police had used to 
suppress civil rights activists and their work were being discredited. In 191, 
an anonymous group called The Citizens Commission to Investigate the 
FBI broke into an agency field office near Philadelphia, stole COINTELPRO 
documents, and leaked them to the press. The publication of domestic spying 
documents prompted a major congressional investigation, headed by Sen. 
Frank Church of Idaho, which discovered that the FBI had been involved 
in political repression since World War I. The Church Committee’s final 
report concluded that COINTELPRO was a “sophisticated vigilante opera-
tion aimed squarely at preventing the exercise of First Amendment rights 
of speech and association.”34 Hoover officially terminated the program in 
191. By the mid 190s, the government was notifying citizens — including 
Portlanders — that they had been targets of COINTELPRO.
While the FBI was actively disrupting civil rights and black community 
organizations, other parts of the federal government were funding efforts 
to improve minority neighborhoods in response to the urban riots of the 
190s. Under the national Model Cities program, neighborhood residents 
took part in a comprehensive citizen-planning process to determine how 
best to allocate federal funds set aside to improve minority communities. 
Albina residents demanded that some funds be used to institute greater civil-
ian oversight of the police. In response, McNamara established the Police 
Community Relations (PCR) Unit in 198.35 The PCR Unit did not allow 
civilian review of police activities; its mission was to improve communica-
tion and relationships between the police and Albina residents. The unit 
was small — consisting of just ten police officers, ten Community Services 
lay officers, and a youth worker — and had no bearing on regular police 
units assigned to the Albina area. Still, the Portland Police Bureau treated 
the unit as an “unwanted relative.” According to the Metropolitan Human 
Rights Commission, the police force did not want to see an improvement in 
community relations. Instead, “top echelon men want to keep it [the bureau] 
twenty-five years behind the times.”3 Even the relatively minor goal of the 
PCR Unit — to open up communication between Albina residents and 
officers who patrolled their neighborhood — was not endorsed by police 
leadership. When community members began to use the PCR Unit as a 
vehicle of reform, some police turned against their fellow officers. 
In 191, Roscoe La Verne “R.L.” Anderson, a community activist who 
had a long, acrimonious relationship with the Portland police, was elected 
to the Model Cities Law and Justice Committee, which worked closely with 
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the PCR Unit.3 In his capacity as a Law and Justice Committee member, 
Anderson developed a good working relationship with the PCR Unit com-
mander, Sgt. John Roe. Anderson’s growing power within the Model Cities 
governing boards and Roe’s tolerance of his presence angered many police 
superiors. In March 191, Roe and another officer were transferred away from 
the PCR Unit, sparking protest by Model Cities Law and Justice Committee 
members. Anderson and other members threatened to go public with the 
names of officers assigned to Albina who had “racist attitudes” if Roe was 
not reinstated.38 By that point, Anderson had been elected treasurer of the 
Portland Metropolitan Steering Committee (PMSC), the governing board 
of the Model Cities program. The Intelligence Unit immediately launched 
a campaign to destroy his credibility; and on April 1, 191, Anderson was 
forced to resign his treasurer post. Shortly after Anderson resigned, Intel-
ligence noted that Roe had “stopped and talked with” him, but the topic 
of their conversation was “unknown.” Following that meeting, Intelligence 
officers began to note Roe’s other activities as well, spying on him as he 
drank coffee and chatted with a former PCR colleague at a downtown 
Denny’s restaurant.39 
Albina District residents participated in the Model Cities Citizens Planning Board 
to help guide neighborhood improvements. Here, they meet in 1970 to discuss the 
expansion of Emanuel Hospital’s campus. Between 1960 and 1980, roughly 1600 
housing units were lost in lower Albina, mainly in the Lloyd District and Eliot 
neighborhoods, as a result of multiple urban renewal and freeway construction 
projects. 
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Ultimately, the PCR Unit was rendered ineffective by Roe’s removal. Nine 
months after Roe’s dismissal, the Model Cities Law and Justice Committee 
commissioned the director of Portland State University’s Criminal Justice 
program, Dr. Lee P. Brown, to write a report on the PCR Unit. According to 
Brown, Roe was “open and honest about the shortcomings of the police,” 
and since his dismissal, the only accomplishment of the program had been 
“its survival.” Brown suggested that the biggest barrier to more positive 
police-community relations was that “police come from a totally different 
environment” and have a “stereotyped view of Model Cities residents.”40 
Norm Monroe, who worked as an administrative assistant in the PCR Unit, 
observed that police patrolled Albina using a “mechanized approach”: they 
stayed in their cars and never walked the streets. Portland police assigned two 
people to each patrol car in Albina — other neighborhoods were assigned 
one. Monroe remarked that “it would be of value to treat the area like any 
other part of the Portland community.”41 
Albina residents wanted law enforcement to treat them like other 
Portlanders. When city government failed to listen to their pleas for equal 
justice, they took their demands to the courts. In the fall of 199, Robert 
Probasco and thirteen other complainants filed a class action lawsuit on 
behalf of more than twenty thousand black Portlanders in U.S. District Court 
against Schrunk, the city council, McNamara, and thirty-eight Portland 
police officers. The suit petitioned the court to put a stop to the systematic 
harassment of blacks by the city and its police force. Police harassment, 
they claimed, resulted in black Portlanders living under “an atmosphere of 
fear and persecution” that had a “chilling effect upon the exercise of their 
federally protected rights.”42 The case was settled in 191 by a consent decree 
(which became known as the Probasco Decree) in which the city admitted 
no wrongdoing but agreed to cease specific activities. The court ordered 
Portland police to stop using “insulting, degrading or ethnically derogatory 
terms” toward blacks, to ban the use of shot-filled “sap gloves” and leaded 
batons, and to instruct all officers that they needed to have a search warrant 
before entering an Albina resident’s home.43 
The Probasco Decree sparked additional changes in police department 
policies. The Portland Police Bureau agreed to create an agency to hear 
citizens’ complaints, to force officers to wear a badge and give their name 
if asked, to provide racial-sensitivity training to officers, and to create an 
affirmative action plan.44 To fulfill the requirements of the decree, the police 
bureau established a mechanism for dealing with citizen complaints. The 
resulting Internal Affairs Division was designed as an in-house alternative to 
a civilian review board, allowing the police force to “do its own cleaning.”45 
Still, some rank-and-file officers were unhappy with the newly established 
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process. They viewed Internal Affairs as a “secret police” and were worried 
that “police officers cannot please all the people all of the time, [and] those 
we arrest will come in here and tell lies.” Those worries proved overblown. 
In its first year, 85 percent of complaints to the Internal Affairs Division were 
deemed “unfounded” or “exonerated,” only 10 percent were sustained, and 
the remainder were dismissed for lack of evidence.4 
Although Albina residents now had an avenue to seek redress in cases 
of police brutality and harassment, the Internal Affairs Division seemed 
to simply rubber-stamp police behavior. The interventionist tactics of the 
Intelligence Unit diminished throughout the 190s, but the Internal Affairs 
Division failed to stop the routine harassment, excessive use of force, and 
pervasive racial discrimination that characterized policing in the Albina 
neighborhood. Rachel James, an Albina resident, wrote Mayor Neil Gold-
schmidt in 194 about incidents of police brutality she had witnessed in the 
community:
For years black people in the Albina area have been bullied and victimized by our so-
called law-men. . . . It seems as if any time a police gets the urge to punch something, they 
snatch the first available black man they see, and use him to satisfy their savage egos.4
Often, police use of force turned deadly. Between October 194 and March 
195, four black men were shot and killed by the Portland police.48 The fourth 
shooting sparked a loud outcry from the community, and the city agreed 
to hold an unprecedented public inquest hearing to determine if Officer 
Kenneth Sanford’s shooting death of Rickie Charles Johnson was justified. 
Typically, police use-of-force cases were heard in closed grand jury sessions. 
The inquest jury determined that the shooting was justified by a vote of five 
to one; the dissenting vote belonged to the sole black jury member.49
In April 195, Sidney Lezak, the U.S. Attorney for Oregon, asked the U.S. 
Department of Justice to launch an investigation into the Portland Police 
Bureau to determine if the deaths of four black Portlanders at the hands 
of the police indicated a broader pattern of civil rights violations.50 Lezak 
initiated the investigation at the behest of the black community, and when 
no evidence of a pattern of civil rights violations emerged, he cautioned that 
the findings did not “necessarily imply approval of the police tactics used in 
each case.” Lezak thanked the community for the “dignity with which they 
pressed their demands and their forbearance in awaiting results.”51 Mean-
while, rank-and-file police officers were becoming increasingly threatened 
by the efforts to provide oversight of their actions. Lt. Tom Tebo, writing in 
the Portland Police Association’s newspaper, compared the federal investiga-
tion and other oversight efforts to “ticks on a cow.”52 If a cow had too many 
ticks, he explained, it would eventually die. 
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In addition to police bru-
tality and civilian oversight, 
a main area of contention 
between the police and the 
black community was bureau 
hiring practices. As part of 
the Probasco Decree, the 
police had agreed to adopt 
an affirmative action policy 
to increase the number of 
minority officers. Initially, the 
bureau adopted the city’s plan 
for affirmative action; but in 
194, Bob Davis, an affirmative 
action specialist assigned to 
the police, quit the department 
because of its lack of com-
mitment to minority hiring.53 
During his short tenure, Davis 
had been excluded from police 
bureau meetings about train-
ing, hiring, and recruitment. 
In 195, the police adopted 
their own affirmative action 
plan, which set an ambitious 
goal of hiring seventy-five 
minority officers on the force 
by 1980.54 
As part of the affirma-
tive action hiring push, the 
Portland Police Bureau sent 
recruiters to visit colleges in the South.55 Sgt. Norm Simmons, who went 
on one of those recruiting trips, lamented the fact that of the ten colleges 
they visited, seven were predominately white. In response to criticism 
about traveling to the South to recruit employees, bureau recruiter Marilyn 
Snowden observed that “for some reason minorities are not attracted to 
police work in their own communities.”5 Dwight Ford, a recruiter for the 
bureau, linked black Portlanders’ reluctance to work for the police bureau 
to “holdover attitudes from the turbulent 190s.”5 Attitudes from the 190s 
were also prevalent among police officers. Portland police officer Tony 
Newman recounted his experiences as one of the few blacks on the force: 
Black officers in the Portland Police 
Department were rare, and their small 
numbers were not representative of the 
population in Portland. Once in the force, 
they faced discrimination and harrassment. 
Bill Travis (left) was one of the first deputy 
sheriffs hired to patrol Vanport City during 
the 1940s. He is shown here in a Portland 
Police Department uniform in the mid 1950s. 
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“I got the feeling after being on the Bureau a few months that I was being 
watched. Every black officer has heard the word ‘nigger.’ Every black officer 
has to listen to ‘nigger’ jokes and doesn’t feel he can object.”58 
By 1980, minority recruitment efforts had been a dismal failure; the 
bureau was still 9 percent white and had only twelve black officers (1. 
percent).59 One reason cited for the lack of minority recruitment was the 
implicit bias contained in the testing materials.0 There also was little sup-
port for affirmative action hiring among rank-and-file officers. When the 
bureau created a billboard campaign to attract minority recruits, one officer 
complained that it “smacks of racism.” The billboard featured seven male 
and female police officers, four of whom were white, posing next to a slo-
gan that stated the right color for a Portland police officer was “True Blue.” 
Another officer objected because he thought it sent a message that “if you 
are not black or female there is no use to coming down to take the test.”1
Despite efforts made during the 190s to diversify and provide effec-
tive oversight of the Portland Police Bureau, the relationship between the 
police and the black community remained essentially unchanged. By 199, 
the Internal Affairs Division sustained only .3 percent of complaints.2 In 
the late 190s, Dan Warren, a black Portland police officer, told a Willamette 
Week reporter about the “surprised looks” he got from black people he saw 
while patrolling. They would tell him: “I didn’t know there was any of us on 
the police force.”3 The lack of diversity in the police force and failures of the 
civilian oversight system contributed to a situation in which 0 percent of the 
people killed by the Portland police during the 190s were black, yet blacks 
comprised just  percent of the population. Oregon’s prisons, furthermore, 
contained one of the “highest percentage of blacks as compared to the state 
population” within the United States.4 
affirmative aCtion poLiCieS and the establishment of an Internal 
Affairs process did not lead to significant changes in the relationship between 
the police and the black community in Portland, but the reforms did provoke 
a political backlash by rank-and-file police officers.5 The “Blue Power” move-
ment was led by the Portland Police Association (PPA), the police officers’ 
union. Officially recognized in 1942, the PPA was the first police union in 
the nation. During the late 190s, police across the country were becom-
ing more politically active and vocal; many, for example, endorsed George 
Wallace’s presidential campaign. After the city recognized the PPA as the 
bargaining representative for the Portland Police Department, the union 
became more involved in local politics. When collective bargaining talks 
with the city stalled in 190, the PPA organized an informational picket of 
the ports along the Willamette River, effectively shutting down shipping in 
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the city as unionized dockworkers refused to cross picket lines. The pickets 
forced the city to negotiate and empowered the police to become more 
involved in politics. In 190, the PPA endorsed its first political candidate, 
Tom Walsh, who ran for Portland City Council and lost against Frank Ivancie, 
who had served as the police commissioner during the contract dispute and 
waterfront pickets. In 19, newly elected PPA president Stan Peters stepped 
up the union’s political involvement, arguing that joining the police force 
did not mean he had to “sign away his constitutional rights.” 
In addition to endorsing political candidates, the PPA also initiated civil 
lawsuits against civilians. The union’s “Blue Liberation” campaign turned 
the Internal Affairs process on its head by having the police sue people who 
had assaulted them during arrest.8 Between 198 and 1982, the union won 
twelve lawsuits against civilians.9 Americans for Effective Law Enforce-
ment recognized the “Blue Liberation” campaign at its 1982 conference and 
celebrated the PPA for being the “vanguard” of a new movement. In 1981, 
the PPA expanded its lawsuit campaign, suing the Oregonian for libel on 
behalf of Sgt. John McNabb after the paper printed an investigative article 
exposing his reputation as a racist police officer.0 
Within this context of a highly empowered police union, Albina com-
munity members founded a new civil rights organization called the Black 
United Front (BUF). In 1981, BUF filed a complaint with the United Nations 
(UN) Commission on Human Rights against the City of Portland and the 
State of Oregon for violating the human rights of black people within the 
criminal justice system.1 At that time, Oregon and Washington had the 
most disproportionate rate of imprisonment for blacks in the nation. Blacks 
comprised just 4 percent of Multnomah County’s population but made up 
22 percent of those arrested.2 At more than five times the proportion of the 
population, that was significantly higher than the national black arrest rate, 
which was three times the proportion of the population. In response to the 
complaint, Peters went to the press proclaiming in the papers and on the 
KATU News Town Hall television program that the police were not racist. 
Black people just committed more crimes per capita, he explained, using 
statistics about rape — historically, a racially charged crime — to support 
his claim.3 Members of BUF acknowledged that their chances of having the 
UN Human Rights Commission investigate their complaint were “slim,” but 
they defended their application by arguing that chances for racial equality 
in Portland were “equally as slim,” compelling them to pursue all avenues 
for equal justice. The commission reviewed the complaint at its summer 
meeting, but no action was taken.4 
While the black community was pushing for significant changes to the 
structure and function of the criminal justice system in Portland, Commis-
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sioner Charles Jordan, who oversaw the Police Bureau, was implementing 
incremental reforms. Frustrated with the lack of results from current affir-
mative action policies, Jordan, the first black elected official in the City of 
Portland, proposed a two-tier civil service system to create more opportuni-
ties for minority candidates to advance through the police hiring process. 
In 1980, the PPA filed a lawsuit to stop the proposed civil service reforms, 
claiming they would “result in a decline in the quality of the police bureau.”5 
A judge ruled that the reforms were wrongly instituted by a board that lacked 
authority to do so, forcing the city to change its affirmative action plans. 
Jordan also appointed a Citizens’ Task Force to review the Internal Affairs 
process and to recommend any necessary changes. When Jordan refused 
to appoint a representative of BUF to the Citizens’ Task Force, BUF disap-
proved of his decision, claiming it was especially “disappointing” coming 
from a black politician. Tensions were high among the PPA, Jordan, and 
BUF, and they were about to become even more enflamed.
On the night of March 12, 1981, Officers Craig Ward and Jim Galloway 
dumped four dead opossums on the doorstep of the Burger Barn, a popular 
black-owned restaurant on Union Avenue.8 Witnesses to the incident saw 
four patrol cars pull up to the restaurant and claimed seven officers were 
involved in dumping the dead animals. Black community organizations 
responded with press conferences and marches denouncing the police 
In 1981, policemen placed dead opossums on the doorstep of the Burger Barn, a 
black-owned restaurant on Union Avenue.
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actions as racially motivated harass-
ment. Burger Barn owner George 
Powe believed it was part of a larger 
campaign of harassment intended to 
drive customers away from his busi-
ness. “You would think the police 
would have better things to do,” 
Powe remarked. Jordan and Police 
Chief Bruce Baker urged patience 
and calm while the Internal Affairs 
Division investigated the incident. 
BUF and other community organiza-
tions demanded the officers be fired 
and described the Internal Affairs 
investigation as being akin to “ask-
ing a hungry dog to guard a meat 
house.”9 On March 25, 1981, protes-
tors marched, calling for the firing 
of all of the officers involved in the 
incident, the formation of a civilian 
review board, and better training and 
supervision of the police. Responding 
to intense public pressure, Jordan 
fired Ward and Galloway on March 
2, 1981; none of the other officers received any reprimand. Ward and Gal-
loway continued to claim that the incident was not racially motivated; they 
merely wanted to “relieve stress.”80 
In response to the firing, Peters organized an emergency PPA meeting. 
The union took a no-confidence vote against Jordan and Baker, circulated 
a petition calling for Jordan’s removal as police commissioner, and orga-
nized a rally to support Ward and Galloway.81 On April 3, 1981, one thousand 
police and supporters marched in a “Cops Have Rights Too” rally. The PPA 
contended that the firing of Ward and Galloway was politically motivated. 
The PPA’s newsletter, The Rap Sheet, said that as the incident wore on it was 
clear the city was willing to “throw a pound of flesh to the wolves” and Jor-
dan had decided to “throw the entire carcass to just satisfy their howling.”82 
After Ward and Galloway lost their jobs, the PPA hired them to work for 
the union with equivalent salaries and filed a grievance against the Police 
Bureau, protesting the firing of the two officers.83
Rumors swirled around City Hall that Mayor Frank Ivancie planned to 
remove the Police Bureau from Jordan’s oversight. Jordan responded that 
Charles Jordan was a Portland city 
commissioner for ten years starting 
in 1974. 
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if Ivancie took control of the police bureau, he would be “admitting that 
Stan Peters is running the city.”84 On June 1, Ivancie relieved Jordan of his 
executive authority over the police bureau. Ivancie’s first act as police com-
missioner was to appoint Lt. Ron Still to lead the bureau, replacing retiring 
Chief Baker. Still had led investigations against the Black Panthers breakfast 
program, was commander of the Special Investigation Division in the 190s 
when a major corruption scandal broke, and was a strong opponent of 
Jordan’s affirmative action hiring policies. Black community leaders called 
Ivancie’s choice for a new chief “frightening.”85 
Two months after Still took over, the grievance filed by the union on 
behalf of Ward and Galloway reached binding arbitration. The arbitrator, 
Gary L. Axon, ruled that Jordan had failed to follow proper procedures, and 
the two officers were reinstated with back pay. The black community was 
outraged and held marches and rallies in protest. Rev. C.T. Vivian, director 
of the National Anti-Klan Network, came to Portland to help organize an 
Portland residents protest in March 1981, demanding the firing of Craig Ward, Jim 
Galloway, and five other officers responsible for dumping dead opossums at the 
Burger Barn restaurant. They also demanded a civilian review board and better 
training and oversight of police.
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anti-Klan committee in response to fears that the arbitrator’s ruling would 
embolden white supremacists in Oregon.8 Vivian saw the opossum incident 
as “one step away from putting the hood on” and believed the symbolic act 
represented a “Klan mentality” within the police force that threatened blacks. 
He went on to say that “it can be passed off as a joke by white people. It can’t 
be passed off as a joke by black people.” The Portland Police Intelligence 
Division responded to the criticism by opening a file on Vivian.8 
Chief Still was an active opponent of any civilian oversight or reform, 
but public opinion grew increasingly critical of the police, driving a renewed 
effort to establish institutional checks on police behavior. In July 1981, the 
Citizens’ Task Force on Internal Affairs, which had been organized by Jor-
dan, released its final recommendations, including a call for the formation 
of a civilian oversight process.88 In May 1982, despite PPA accusations that 
Jordan was “still attempting to run the police bureau,” the city council 
voted to establish a citizens’ review committee. The day after passage of 
the review committee proposal, the PPA launched a petition drive to put 
the measure on the November ballot.89 The “Citizens for a Safe Portland 
Campaign” was the first referendum drive to reach the ballot in thirty years; 
the last referendum held in Portland had repealed the city council’s public 
accommodation act, which eliminated racial segregation in commercial 
establishments in 1950.90 In November 1982, Portlanders voted by a narrow 
margin to accept the city council’s citizen review process, and the Portland 
Police Internal Investigations Auditing Committee (PIIAC) was established. 
PIIAC could not investigate citizens’ complaints or impose discipline on 
members of the Police Bureau; the committee merely provided oversight to 
the Internal Affairs process by issuing nonbinding recommendations. Still, 
the PPA remained staunchly opposed to PIIAC and encouraged officers not 
to cooperate.91 By 198, only two of PIIAC’s twenty-eight recommendations 
had been fully followed. Committee vice chairwoman Jean Vessup said: “It’s 
frustrating not being taken seriously.”92
In 1985, Bud Clark began his mayoral term determined to improve the 
image of the Portland Police Bureau. He made leadership changes, replac-
ing Still with the first female chief, Penny Harrington, but the leadership 
change did not result in any serious challenge to policing on the ground.93 
On April 20, 1985, police killed Lloyd “Tony” Stevenson, an African American 
off-duty security guard, in front of a convenience store near his home in 
Northeast Portland. Stevenson had helped calm a crowd during an alterca-
tion between the store owner and a suspected thief, but when police arrived, 
Stevenson, the only black man in the crowd, was wrestled to the ground 
by three officers and choked to death after Officer Gary Barbour used a 
“sleeper hold” on him.94 
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Portlanders protest the killing of Lloyd “Tony” Stevenson by Portland police in 1985.
In response, Harrington temporarily banned the use of the carotid artery 
“sleeper hold.” After the ban was announced, Officers Richard Montee and 
Paul Wickersham printed 100 T-shirts that pictured a smoking gun and 
read: “Don’t Choke ’Em. Smoke ’Em.” They began selling the shirts on the 
day of Stevenson’s funeral.95 Harrington fired the officers, and the PPA leapt 
to their defense, immediately filing a wrongful termination grievance. The 
Rap Sheet claimed the timing of the T-shirt sale was unfortunate because 
“only twelve people had a chance to purchase them,” and insisted that the 
T-shirts were not insensitive, but rather reflected the “black humor that 
police use so they can live with themselves after picking up dead children.” 
Much of the police force agreed. Three-quarters of officers believed the 
T-shirts were a “harmless prank that was blown out of proportion by the 
media”; and while 80 percent thought the T-shirts were bad for morale, 95 
percent believed the firings of Montee and Wickersham were harmful to 
police morale.9 On October 23, 1985, arbitrator Paul Hanlon found that 
the city had wrongfully terminated Montee and Wickersham.9 They were 
immediately reinstated and their discipline reduced to six months lost pay. 
A few days later, the two officers filed a civil suit against the city, claiming 
their First Amendment rights had been violated. The case was dismissed.98 
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Barbour, who had used the “sleeper hold” on Stevenson, was never 
disciplined for his actions. For the first time since Rickie Charles Johnson’s 
death in 195, the city held a public inquest to look into the circumstances of 
a police-related death. The county district attorney questioned thirty-eight 
witnesses in a packed courtroom. The inquest jury found that Stevenson’s 
death by choke hold — and the failure of officers to apply cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation — was homicide. Community leader Ron Herndon saw the 
all-white jury’s verdict as a “very encouraging sign,” but the inquest findings 
could not be used in any civil or criminal proceedings.99 Just weeks after 
the inquest, a grand jury decided not to bring charges against the officers. 
Stevenson’s family, which included a wife and five children, would later be 
awarded $00,000 by the City of Portland in an out-of-court settlement of 
a wrongful death lawsuit. 
In 194, the grand jury in the Cleotis Rhodes case was troubled by the 
fact that the police shot a man accused of a traffic violation and failed to 
provide adequate and timely medical attention that could have saved his life. 
Twenty-one years later, the inquest jury in the Stevenson case expressed similar 
concerns. Both cases sparked use-of-force policy changes, but those rules did 
not stop deaths from occurring in Albina at the hands of the Portland police. 
Inquest hearing jurors visit the convenience store on NE Weidler Street, where 
Stevenson was killed in 1985.
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the poLiCy ChanGeS were largely ineffectual because the problems 
between the police and Portland’s black community were symptomatic of a 
much larger social issue — race relations in the city as a whole. At its roots, 
the city’s relationship with its black community was fraught with enmity. 
Blacks had never been welcome in Oregon, and although the civil rights 
movement opened up unprecedented opportunities for African Americans 
between 194 and 1985, the city remained heavily segregated. As late as 198, 
Portland as a whole was 8 percent white; and of the city’s entire black 
population, 80 percent lived in the inner northeast area.100 
Although blacks were the majority population within the Albina commu-
nity, they had little control over neighborhood conditions or institutions. In 
the late 190s, only 89 out of 1,98 businesses in the area were black-owned.101 
Between 195 and 190, 0 of the 200 businesses along the main stretch 
of NE Union Avenue closed, leaving 35 vacant storefronts in a ten-block 
zone.102 As white business owners fled Albina during the 190s and 190s, the 
storefronts remained vacant, in part because Portland-area banks refused to 
issue business loans in redlined black neighborhoods. (Redlining is a term 
used to describe the process of denying loans to specific neighborhoods, 
primarily based on the community’s social characteristics.) Aspiring black 
entrepreneurs were shut out of their own communities. City-wide, black 
home-ownership, employment, and high school graduation rates all lagged 
behind those of whites. The only statistics where blacks surpassed whites 
were arrest and incarceration rates. As dean of the University of Oregon law 
school Dr. Derrick Bell observed in the mid 1980s: 
You might see few blacks on the streets of Portland, and virtually none outside the city. 
But the cellblocks of the state prison contains the highest percentage of blacks as com-
pared to the state population of any state in the nation save our sister state, Washington.103
At the same time, Portland had gained a national reputation as one of the 
most livable cities, yet as Herndon noted, “that livability is not there for 
blacks, instead we get prison, unemployment, bad housing, and Klan-type 
harassment against a black family living in a Portland suburb.”104
The lack of community ownership and control was glaringly reflected in 
the way the neighborhood was policed. In a report for the Governor’s Com-
mission on Black Affairs titled “Police in the 1980s,” Charles Jordan noted 
that as long as the police force remained predominantly white, blacks would 
assume it defended white interests. Writer James Baldwin made a similar 
observation in 190, using language reminiscent of the colonial model:
The only way to police a ghetto is to be oppressive. . . . Their presence is an insult and 
it would be, even if they spent their entire day feeding gumdrops to the children. They 
represent the force of the white world and that world’s criminal profit and ease, to keep 
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Boarded-up storefronts in the Albina neighborhood, shown here in this 1968 
photograph, are signs of disinvestment in Portland’s African American community.
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the black man corralled up here, in its place. The badge, the gun and the holster, and the 
swinging club make vivid what will happen should his rebellion become overt. . . . He 
moves through Harlem, therefore, like an occupying soldier in a bitterly hostile country; 
which is precisely what, and where he is, and is the reason he walks in twos and threes.105
the CoLoniaL metaphor applied to policing in black communities 
during the 190s continued to be apt, despite any assumptions that the 
relationship between the police and African American communities had 
dramatically improved. When Bud Clark ran for mayor in the mid 1980s, 
for example, he was surprised to learn that “people were suspicious of the 
police. They saw them as an occupying army.”10 The three main demands the 
black community had pushed for throughout the 190s, 190s, and 1980s in 
Portland — a reduction of police brutality, civilian oversight, and increased 
representation in police ranks — remained largely unrealized. 
The relationship between the Portland police and the Albina community 
remained contentious throughout those decades because every organized 
attempt to reform the police was met with swift and hostile resistance. The 
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PPA, especially under the leadership of Stan Peters, took over the retalia-
tory role the Intelligence Unit had played during the 190s. While it is well 
within a labor union’s purview to defend its members against administrative 
overreach and to provide representation to workers accused of misdeeds, 
the PPA went far above its stated mission to advocate for workplace rights 
and instead became a quasi-police force, accountable to no one, that flexed 
its muscle any time politicians or activists criticized or attempted to reform 
the police. Jordan once reminded rank-and-file officers that police are not 
like other public employees, because they have significantly more power 
than most public servants.10 The combination of the PPA’s tenacious and 
vitriolic responses to any efforts to institute oversight of officers’ actions 
and the power that police have compared to other civil servants led to a 
situation where many believed that, at times, the police union was actually 
running the city.108
Despite that perception, the police union does not run the city. It does 
not design and implement bureau policy. That responsibility lies with the 
police commissioner, mayor, and the city council. During this time period, 
however, every mayor, from Schrunk to Clark, failed to confront the police 
head-on. Even the most active reformers, such as Goldschmidt and Jordan, 
backed down when the police union dug in its heels. Most politicians ignored 
issues of racial injustice within the police department and responded only 
when the black community organized such strong resistance that they were 
forced to get involved.
Given the lack of support from elected officials and the outright hostility 
from rank-and-file police officers, it is no wonder that Portland’s black com-
munity sought assistance from courts, the federal government, and even the 
United Nations. Their appeals to federal authorities to realize incremental 
reform was often more successful than their appeals to local politicians. 
The Probasco Decree, for example, laid the groundwork for many of the 
reforms that took place in the 190s. Still, those external appeals fell far short 
of ensuring equal justice for black citizens in Portland. 
SinCe 1985, the Portland Police Bureau has adopted community policing 
and hired its first black police chief, but deep-rooted problems remain. In 
2012, a federal Department of Justice investigation found that the Portland 
police systematically have violated the civil rights of mentally ill residents. 
In a negotiated settlement with the U.S. Department of Justice, the police 
have agreed to modify use-of-force protocol and to establish a Community 
Oversight Advisory Board to monitor the implementation of the settlement. 
An interracial coalition of organizations demanded the federal investigation 
in response to the deaths of a number of Portland citizens at the hands of the 
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police, including that of Aaron Campbell, a grief-stricken, young black man 
who police shot in the back after they were called to check on his welfare by 
concerned relatives. Ron Frashour, the officer who killed Aaron Campbell, 
was fired for failing to follow police use-of-force protocol. In keeping with 
precedents, Frashour was reinstated with back pay after the union pushed 
the case to arbitration. At the time of this writing, Mayor Sam Adams is 
challenging the legality of the arbitrator’s ruling.109 
While Adams’s principled stance is encouraging, the circumstances of 
Campbell’s death and the events that followed it remain troubling. Police 
initially told Campbell’s family that he had committed suicide, and after 
family members filed a lawsuit, they began to experience police harass-
ment. In a move reminiscent of Intelligence Division actions in the 190s, 
the police attempted to file charges against Campbell’s uncle based on an 
unnamed informant’s testimony that the uncle offered a bounty to anyone 
who would shoot and kill Frashour. The district attorney’s office declined to 
file charges. According to Campbell’s mother, Marva Davis, “it is a common 
perception in the Portland black community that the police will retaliate 
against anyone who challenges their authority.”110 Her statement indicates 
that even now, little has changed. In addition to Campbell, black Portland-
ers Byron Hammick, Kendra James, Willie Thomas Grigsby, James Jahar 
Perez, Vernon Allen, and Keaton Otis were all killed in confrontations with 
the Portland police over the past decade.111 The civilian oversight function 
remains weak and ineffectual, and the police force is almost 90 percent 
white, with African American officers just 3.4 percent of the force, despite 
comprising .4 percent of the overall population and 25 percent of Albina 
District neighborhoods.112 
The African American community in Portland — now more spatially 
dispersed, partially due to gentrification — may continue to suffer from 
police brutality. According to Dr. Leroy Haynes, chair of the Coalition for 
Justice and Police Reform, the main question is whether the city council 
“has enough courage and fortitude to exercise their authority” over law 
enforcement in the city.113 
The colonial model is useful for understanding the historical continuities 
in police-community relations in Portland’s Albina District and in black 
urban communities nationwide. Black thinkers and activists of the 190s 
explained police behavior as part of the colonization process that ghettoized 
black citizens, enforced their political and economic dependency, and thus 
led to the underdevelopment of black communities. Black citizens saw police 
officers as representatives of a state that had delegated “the legitimate use of 
violence to police authority” in the interest of black subordination.114 The 
problem was not just a matter of individually prejudiced cops, but rather 
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institutionalized racism within the entire criminal justice system — and 
within society as a whole. According to Staples, the model gained “con-
siderable credence” among black prisoners who, considering themselves 
“political prisoners,” continued to resist colonial domination through prison 
protests.115 Many black urbanites interpreted their position in the American 
social structure as that of a colonized community during the era of often-
violent resistance to the civil rights struggle for freedom and equality, and 
we should reconsider the model’s utility. 
The police have been critically important agents of an oppressive structure 
that resisted change in Portland and cities nationally. Complicit politicians, 
perhaps despite good intentions, repeatedly thwarted the attempts by Albina 
residents to reform the police. Those politicians would fit Albert Memmi’s 
description of “de facto colonizers” in The Colonizer and the Colonized, 
because, “in the eyes of the colonized” they hold “a privileged economic 
position,” belong to the “political system of oppression,” or participate in “an 
effectively negative complex [that is, web of institutional structures] toward 
the colonized,” perhaps unconsciously or perhaps not. Memmi observed: “The 
distinction between deed and intent has no great significance in the colonial 
Mourners offer their respects at the funeral of Lloyd “Tony” Stephenson, a former 
U.S. Marine killed by Portland police in 1985.
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